Conflict of Interest Policies at Canadian Universities and Medical Schools: Some Lessons from the AMSA PharmFree Scorecard by Mathieu, Ghislaine et al.
G Mathieu, E Smith, M-J Potvin, B Williams-Jones 
BioéthiqueOnline 2012, 1/13
(http://bioethiqueonline.ca/1/13)
Conflict of Interest Policies at Canadian Universities and 
Medical Schools: Some Lessons from the AMSA PharmFree 
Scorecard
ARTICLE (RÉVISION PAR LES PAIRS / PEER-REVIEWED)
Ghislaine Mathieu1, Elise Smith1, Marie-Josée Potvin1, Bryn Williams-Jones1
Reçu/Received: 4 Jun 2012 Publiée/Published: 18 Jul 2012                 Modifié/Revised:  18 Mar 2013 
Éditeurs/Editors: Zubin Master, Charles Marsan & Charles Dupras 
Évaluateurs externes/Peer-Reviewers: John Kaplan & Marilyn J Field
© 2012 G Mathieu, E Smith, M-J Potvin, B Williams-Jones, Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License
Résumé Abstract
Lancée en 2007, l’American Medical Students Association  
(AMSA) PharmFree Scorecard  est un classement annuel 
des politiques de conflit d’intérêts (CI) de centres médicaux 
américains. Il se concentre sur les CI qui peuvent survenir 
lorsque  la  formation  médicale  est  influencée  par  les 
relations  université-industrie,  en  particulier  ceux 
concernant  l’industrie  pharmaceutique  et  les  dispositifs 
médicaux. Le  PharmFree Scorecard s’est montré influent 
dans l’initiation de modification des politiques concernant la 
gestion des CI dans les institutions médicales américaines. 
Il fournit donc un point de départ utile pour une réflexion 
sur  la  manière  et  les  raisons  pour  lesquelles  les 
établissements  d’enseignement  médicaux  dans  d’autres 
pays - et pour nos fins, le Canada - devraient accorder plus 
d’attention à l’identification et à la gestion appropriée des 
CI. La méthodologie de la PharmFree Scorecard consiste à 
examiner  la  diversité  des  facteurs  et  des  intérêts  qui 
pourraient influencer l’enseignement médical, il s’agit donc 
d’une approche intéressante pour l’analyse des politiques 
de CI des écoles de médecine. Pour évaluer son utilité et 
son applicabilité à l’extérieur des États-Unis, nous avons 
décidé d’appliquer le PharmFree Scorecard aux politiques 
de  CI  des  16  universités  canadiennes  accueillent  les 
écoles  de  médecine.  Dans  l’ensemble,  les  institutions 
canadiennes se classent très mal, particulièrement en ce 
qui  concerne  la  disponibilité  d’outils  d’éducation  et  de 
formation concernant l'identification et la gestion de CI pour 
le personnel, les étudiants et les professeurs. Cependant, 
les différences entre les contextes d’enseignement médical 
aux  États-Unis  et  au  Canada  (en  ce  qui  concerne  la 
gouvernance  et  le  financement  des  universités  par 
exemple) limitent, dans une certaine mesure, l’applicabilité 
directe du  classement  AMSA.  Même si  elles  peuvent  et 
doivent aller plus loin en élaborant leurs propres politiques 
de CI et procédures, les écoles de médecine canadiennes 
- et leurs universités d’accueil - ont néanmoins beaucoup à 
apprendre  des  indications  fournies  par  le  classement 
AMSA PharmFree Scorecard.
Launched  in  2007,  the  American  Medical  Students 
Association  (AMSA)  PharmFree  Scorecard  is  an  annual 
ranking  of  conflict  of  interest  (COI)  policies  at  American 
medical centres; it focuses on COIs that may occur when 
medical  education seems  likely  to  be  influenced  by 
university-industry  relationships,  especially  those with the 
pharmaceutical  and  medical  device  industries.  The 
PharmFree Scorecard has proven influential in stimulating 
changes  in  policy  regarding  the  management  of  COI  at 
American  medical  institutions,  thus  it  provides  a  useful 
jumping off  point  for  reflection on how and why medical 
education  institutions  in  other  countries  –  and  for  our 
purposes,  Canada  –  should  pay  more  attention  to  the 
appropriate  identification  and  management  of  COI.  The 
PharmFree Scorecard methodology examines a diversity of 
factors  and  interests  that  could  influence  medical 
education;  as  such,  it  is  an  interesting  approach  to 
analysing the COI policies of medical schools. To test its 
utility or applicability outside the US, we decided to apply 
the  PharmFree Scorecard to  the  COI  policies  of  the  16 
Canadian  universities  hosting  medical  schools.  Overall, 
Canadian  institutions rank  very  poorly,  especially  in 
ensuring that education and training tools are provided to 
staff,  students  and  faculty  members  to  enable  the 
identification  and  management  of  COI.  However, 
differences  between  the  US  and  Canadian  medical 
education contexts,  e.g.,  with  regards  to  the governance 
and funding of universities, limit to some extent the direct 
applicability  of  the  AMSA  ranking.  Canadian  medical 
schools – and their  host  universities  – nonetheless have 
much  to  learn  from  insights  provided  by  the  AMSA 
PharmFree  Scorecard  ranking,  although  they  can  and 
should go further in developing their own COI policies and 
procedures.
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Introduction 
In the biomedical literature, much attention is given to the behaviour of health research and education 
institutions regarding the disclosure and management of conflicts of interest (COI) [1-3]. Of particular 
concern  is  the  growing  and  problematic  influence  (i.e.,  creating  bias)  of  the  pharmaceutical  and 
medical device industries in physician training, clinical practice and research [4,5]. As a result, medical 
schools  and  professional  associations  in  North  America  and  Europe  have  developed  policies  to 
address financial COI [6-9] and these have become the subject of much scholarly analysis [2,10-12]. 
In 2009, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) issued an exhaustive report examining the many issues raised 
by COI in medical research, education and clinical practice. The IOM propose a simple yet effective 
definition of COI: “A conflict of interest is a set of circumstances that creates a risk that professional 
judgment or actions regarding a primary interest will be unduly influenced by a secondary interest” [8, 
p. 46].
The American Medical Students Association (AMSA) PharmFree Scorecard is an important example 
of the attention being given to financial COI [13]. Essentially, the Scorecard evaluates the COI policies 
of US medical schools, mainly scrutinizing their interaction with the pharmaceutical industry. In recent 
years, the Scorecard has played a significant role in sensitizing US medical education institutions to 
the issue of financial COI, and to the need to adopt, enforce and make transparent and available their  
institutional COI policies [14]. Curious about the possibility of extending this approach to evaluations 
of non-US institutional COI policies, we decided to apply the AMSA ranking methodology to Canadian 
medical schools. It turns out, however, that for the most part Canadian medical schools do not have 
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their own COI policies because they are governed by the policies of their host universities, so we 
applied the AMSA method to these more general university COI policies. While one might argue that 
the AMSA method should only  be applied to medical faculty  COI – because of specific concerns 
related to pharmaceutical and medical device involvement in medical education – we decided that 
more general university policies would probably have the same essential content as those policies 
developed  by  and  pertinent  for  medical  schools.  Medical  schools  share  a  common commitment 
towards both education and research, so while pharmaceutical and device industries may be involved 
in medical education, they are also major sponsors of medical research involving clinician-researchers 
and students in both the clinical and research settings.
 
Interestingly, the 16 Canadian university COI policies that we examined ranked very poorly according 
to the AMSA Scorecard. An analysis of these findings allowed us to identify important limitations with 
the AMSA method as  it  relates  to evaluating the robustness of  COI  policies  and procedures.  Of 
particular concern is the Scorecard’s focus on financial COI and the use of disclosure as the primary 
mechanism for the management of unavoidable COI. Specifically, the Scorecard grades disclosure as 
the  most relevant  management  strategy  for  unavoidable  COI  in  the  eleven  elements  or  “policy 
domains”  evaluated,  while  it  should,  we  argue,  be  the  only  the  first  part of  a  comprehensive 
management  strategy.  For  example,  when  interacting  with  industry  in  the  context  of  research 
collaborations or student training in industry settings, disclosure is an essential first step in managing 
the unavoidable COI that arise. Nevertheless, this first COI management step may and often should 
be followed by  other  mechanisms to reduce the risks or  harms associated  with  COI  (e.g.,  open 
discussion).  The  focus  on  disclosure  shows,  we  argue,  an  important  conceptual  mismatch  with 
standard recommendations in the ethics and policy literature [15,16], where disclosure is recognised 
to be a necessary but insufficient mechanism for managing COI. Finally, the AMSA Scorecard focuses 
on COI at the individual level rather than at the institutional level. That is, it does not consider how 
institutional arrangements (e.g., involvement with start-up companies, solicitation and acceptance of 
industry endowments for faculty positions, buildings or programs) may create important COI for the 
institution.
Despite these limitations, our critical approach to the AMSA Scorecard – and our application of it to 
Canadian university COI policies – provided important insights regarding areas in need of significant 
improvement, namely, the need to develop stronger COI policies, make them accessible and ensure 
training and support for faculty, staff and students in the identification and management of COI. 
The AMSA Pharmfree Scorecard
Founded in  1950 under  the auspices  of  the  American  Medical  Association,  AMSA is  the  largest 
independent US association of physicians-in-training. Because medical colleges have “social, moral 
and  ethical  obligations  of  the  profession  of  medicine”,  AMSA lobbies  for  the  “removal  of  COI  in 
medicine” and for “evidence-based rather than marketing-based prescribing practices”;  its primary 
concern are the involvement of the pharmaceutical and device industries in clinical education and 
research [17]. To launch its first evaluation in 2007, AMSA developed a comprehensive framework to 
assess the content of institutional policies. The PharmFree Scorecard grades US medical schools 
according  to  their  policies  regulating  relationships  between  students,  faculty  members,  and  the 
pharmaceutical  and  device  industries.  In  a  context  where  industry  involvement  and  influence  in 
academia were raising concerns about financial COI, an issue that looked “inevitable” in US medical 
schools at  the time,  AMSA sought  to bring attention to the problem of COI and to then pressure 
medical centres to implement strong policies limiting financial COI associated with university-industry 
relations [14].
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Each year since 2007, the AMSA PharmFree Scorecard group invites “all U.S. schools of allopathic 
and osteopathic medicine” to voluntarily submit their COI policies for assessment[18].1 Each policy 
received  is  anonymized,  assessed  and  then  graded  by  two  independent  assessors  (names  and 
affiliations listed on the AMSA website,  www.amsa.org). The evaluation examines eleven aspects or 
“policy domains” where COI can arise and should be addressed: limits on gifts and individual financial 
relationships  with  industry,  receipt  of  pharmaceutical  samples  and  speakers’  fees,  purchasing 
authority,  on-site/off-site  industrial  educational  programs  and  scholarships,  and  faculty/medical 
student COI training. Each domain is scored on a three-point scale (0 to 3), for a maximum total score 
of 33 points for the best policy: 0 points for “Institutions that do not respond to requests for policies or 
decline to participate”; 1 point for “Policy is absent or unlikely to have a substantial effect on behavior”; 
2 points for “Good progress toward model policy” and 3 points for a “Model policy” [18]. AMSA does 
not define what constitutes a “Model policy”, but we can infer that it is one that provides guidance and 
recommended standards that could become a reference to ensure optimal governance. A letter grade 
is then assigned based on the final scores: A ≥ 85%, B ≥ 70%, C ≥ 60%, D ≥ 40%, F < 40%, and I = In 
process. Institutions failing to report or declining to participate in the survey automatically receive an F 
grade. The methodology and complete results of the PharmFree Scorecard are available online [13].
Of 152 medical schools invited to participate in the 2011-2012 Scorecard, 149 participated; of the 152 
schools, 28 schools received an A (18%), 74 (49%) a B, 15 (10%) a C, and 13 (9%) a D, while 9 
schools (6%) received an F. Most of the remaining schools were granted “in progress” or “in process”  
designations due to ongoing policy development.  An examination of the rankings over the five-year 
history  of  the  survey reveals  substantial  change,  particularly  in  the  last  two years.  Only  14% of 
schools were ranked A or B in 2007-2008 compared to 67% in 2011-2012.  These rankings through 
time  show  significant  improvements  between  2008  and  2012.  This  is  a  tremendous  increase 
compared to the 79 (52%) schools that were assigned A and B in 2010-2011, 45 schools (30%) in  
2009-2010, 29 (14%) in 2008-2009, and 21 (14%) in 2007-2008. COI has clearly become a central 
issue in  medical administration and education and more US medical  schools are recognizing the 
importance of implementing thorough COI policies [19].
While  the  2011-2012 ranking reveals  that  some US medical  schools  still  need to  develop  more 
appropriate  policies  and regulations  regarding  their  relations  with  the  pharmaceutical  and  device 
industries, the change in rankings over the previous five AMSA PharmFree Scorecards shows that 
there have been major improvements in the development of “model” COI policies.
Methods
From our perspective, the AMSA methodology is a fruitful starting point to evaluate institutional COI 
policies.  Inspired by this methodology, we conducted our own evaluation and ranking of  the COI 
policies of the 16 Canadian universities hosting medical schools. Contrary to the AMSA evaluation 
that  focuses  essentially  on  medical  school  COI  policies,  we  examined  the  policies  of  Canadian 
academic  institutions  hosting  medical  schools,  since  few  medical  schools  in  Canada  have 
independent  COI  policies.  We  did  not  contact  institutions  directly,  but  from  the  Association  of 
Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) website (www.aucc.ca) we were able to identify those 
institutions hosting medical schools and downloaded from their websites the most recent documents 
referring  to  COI  policies  or  guidelines.  Keywords (in  English and French)  used to retrieve these 
policies  were:  conflict  of  interest  policy  +  name of  institution,  governance  +  name of  institution; 
politique conflit  d’intérêts + name of  institution.  Very often,  COI policies were referred to in other 
policies (e.g., nepotism policy, solicitation for gifts, statement on consulting policy). These documents 
were collected between March and September 2010 (Table 1), thus some have probably changed in 
the  intervening  years;  it  should  be  noted,  however,  that  9  institutions  had  revised  their  policies 
1 Most of the medical schools sampled closely follow their host institution’s policy (e.g., Dartmouth, Pittsburgh), although 
some medical schools also have specific policies for addressing COI arising from institutional holdings or investments (e.g.,  
Stanford).
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between 2006 and 2009. We can only speculate to the reasons for such revisions, but they may 
include increased attention to changing policies and practices at American institutions (including NIH 
requirements, which affect Canadian researchers with US financing), as well as moves to respond to 
recommendations from Canadian actors such as the Canadian Institutes of Health Research [20].
Table 1: Canadian Institutional COI Policies and Guidelines
Institution COI policies/guidelines Effective Date
Alberta Conflict of Interest and Commitment and Institutional Conflict June 26, 2009
Conflict of Interest and Conflict of Commitment Reporting Assessment 
Procedure
November 16, 2009
Managing Conflict of Interest in employment procedure June 26, 2009
British Columbia Conflict of Interest and Conflict of Commitment March 2005
Calgary Conflict of Interest Policy September 1, 1987
Dalhousie Conflict of Interest June 24, 2002
Laval Politique  sur  l’intégrité  en  recherche  et  création  et  sur  les  conflits 
d’intérêts
May 20, 2009
Manitoba Conflict of Interest June 16, 2009
Gift and Gratuities offered to University employees January 20, 2009
Nepotism January 27, 2009
McGill Regulation on Conflict of Interest June 15, 2009
McMaster Statement on Conflict of Interest in Research March 11, 2009
Procedures  for  Inquiries  and  Hearings  regarding  Allegations  of 
Misconduct in Research for Faculty, Staff & Post-Doctoral Fellows at 
McMaster University
March 27, 2002
Code of Conduct for Faculty December 8, 1994
Academic Integrity Policy September 1, 2008
Conflict of Interest Guidelines: Undergraduate and Graduate Studies February 14, 2001
Conflict  of  Interest  Policy  for  non-academic  staff  and  academic 
administrators
March 27, 2002
Statement on Consulting Policy and Procedures January 14, 1976
Distribution of Income from the Sale of Instructional Materials March 16, 1981
Staff Policy on Consulting and Freelancing May 20, 1997
Memorial Conflict of Interest (policy) March 31, 2009
Solicitation of Gifts Policy April 1, 1987
Montreal Règlement sur les conflits d’intérêt November 24, 2009
Ottawa Conflits d’intérêt – Membres du personnel October 20, 2009
Queen’s Conflict of Interest and Conflict of Commitment September 28, 2001
Saskatchewan Conflict of Interest December 12, 2008
Sherbrooke Politique, règles et procédures sur l’intégrité en recherche et sur les 
conflits d’intérêts
May 20, 2006
Toronto Conflict of Interest – Academic Staff June 22, 1994
Conflict of Interest – Librarians March 9, 1995
Provost’s  Memorandum  on  Conflict  of  Interest  and  close  personal 
relations
n/a*
Western Conflicts of Interest September 28, 2000
*n/a = non-applicable
Due to the fact that our evaluation was based on those COI policies that were available online in 2010 
– i.e., we did not explicitly solicit submissions as in the AMSA scoring – we had to adapt the AMSA 
scoring to replace their 0 evaluation for “Institutions that do not respond to requests for policies or 
decline to participate”. We thus used the following 3 point scale, which focused on the content of 
policies: 
• 0 points when a policy or guideline was absent or inaccessible, or lacked key policy elements 
(e.g., lack of COI training); 
• 1 point  when policy elements were partially treated or treated through another institutional 
policy (e.g., misconduct activities, no specific restrictions for non-academic activities, nothing 
specific to financial  COI or  conflict  of  commitment,  no clear  definition of COI,  once-a-year 
disclosure);
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• 2  points  when  policy  elements  were  addressed,  but  still  incomplete  (e.g.,  no  designated 
institutional COI committee, no clear path for disclosure management, no specific limits to gifts 
or donations, no public disclosure of COI); and
• 3 points when policy elements could be cited as models (e.g.,  determined % or $ max. in 
equity holding in line with US federal requirements, disclosure prior to beginning of activity and 
COI management plan). 
We did not conduct a blind review as in the AMSA exercise, but instead performed a thorough review 
of the different institutional policies and guidelines associated with COI issues to extract the most 
pertinent elements identified according to the AMSA framework; this was followed by a second review 
of those specific elements used for ranking institutions. A first coder evaluated all of the university COI 
policies, guidelines or procedures (when available), and a second coder verified the overall calculation 
of the first coder, but did not do any independent coding to calculate inter-coder reliability.
Results
Our application of the modified AMSA scoring to the 16 Canadian institutional COI policies produced 
some startling findings. At first glance, Canadian institutions appear to have very weak policies, as all 
received D or F grades, with the exception of the University of Sherbrooke, which obtained a C grade 
(Table 1). 
Table 2: Ranking Canadian Universities with the Modified AMSA PharmFree Scorecard
        Interest
University
Industry relationships Education Grade
Gifts Consult.
fees
Speaking Public / 
internal 
disclosure
Samples Purchasing Sales 
rep
On-site 
training
Off-site
training
Industrial
scholarships
COI 
training
% Rank
Alberta 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 45% D
British Columbia 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 48% D
Calgary 1 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 30% F
Dalhousie 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 45% D
Laval 3 2 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 45% D
Manitoba 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 45% D
McGill 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 48% D
McMaster 3 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 42% D
Memorial 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 45% D
Montreal 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 48% D
Ottawa 2 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 42% D
Queen’s 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 39% F
Saskatchewan 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 45% D
Sherbrooke 3 3 3 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 55% C
Toronto 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 45% D
Western 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 39% F
In this modified AMSA scoring, Canadian institutions may appear to perform particularly poorly with 
regards to interaction with industry when dealing with gifts, consulting, speaking, samples, purchasing 
matters, as those issues were almost non-existent or not available in any of the 16 COI policies. 
Similarly,  policy mechanisms to address the involvement of industry in education or training were 
typically very weak or non-existent. So in terms of specific guidelines about industry involvement in 
university education, almost all Canadian policies obtained a grade of 1 out of 3. With regards to the 
implementation of mechanisms to provide at least minimal training for academic and administrative 
staff and students about how to deal with COI, all policies received a 0 grade, except for Sherbrooke 
which obtained 2 out of 3. These dramatic shortcomings in Canadian institutional COI policies may be 
explained by the fact that the policies did not include all of the policy elements adopted by AMSA (e.g., 
gifts, consultant services, purchasing authority), or because different COI issues are being addressed 
in a diversity of policies and procedures (e.g.,  McMaster).  For example, we gave a poor score to 
policy  elements  such  as  gifts,  or  external  consulting  services,  on-site  or  off-site  training,  public 
disclosure (e.g., on a web site), and industry scholarships because we could not find any references 
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to gifts and donations in the specific COI policy (e.g., University of Montreal). But that does not mean 
that such issues are not dealt with in another policy mechanism or through practical guidelines. 
In some universities, there are so many policies addressing different aspects of COI (e.g., in policies  
on intellectual  property,  academic  integrity,  nepotism,  purchasing guidelines,  research ethics)  that 
members of the institution (e.g., professors, researchers, students) may be either overwhelmed, not 
know which policy is most pertinent, or not even know that these policies exist. This situation is all the 
more problematic in the context of medical schools, where some members (e.g., professors, clinician-
researchers,  students)  are  based  in  the  university  while  others  are  fulltime  in  affiliated  hospital 
research centres, which may have their own policies or guidelines. So while it may be important to 
have a cluster of overlapping and cross-referenced policies and guidelines addressing COI (e.g., the 
University of Manitoba COI policy is cross-referenced with policies or procedures dealing nepotism, 
research  agreements,  research  ethics,  gift  and  gratuities  offered  to  University  employees, 
responsibilities of academic staff with regard to students), we agree with the AMSA ranking that a 
central policy should deal with the major elements associated with financial (and non-financial) COI, if 
it is to be at all practical and relevant to members of the institution. A patchwork from different policies 
creates a higher risk of incoherence than does a central policy with a coherent framework. 
Interactions between US medical schools and the pharmaceutical and medical device industries may 
date back further than in Canada, in part due to the stimulus provided by the 1980 US Bayh-Dole Act, 
and  thus  explain  to  some  extent  the  significant  attention  given  to  managing  the  financial  COI 
associated with industry involvement in medical education. Nonetheless, over the past 25 years there 
has been a tremendous increase in university-industry relationships in Canada, the recognition of 
which has lead Canadian institutions to consolidate various policies as well as develop explicit COI 
policies (see Table 1). When AMSA launched its first survey in 2007, many US medical schools may 
have been in the same position as Canadian institutions are today. And while the AMSA Scorecard is 
focused on those COI specifically associated with pharmaceutical and device industry involvement in 
medical schools, the AMSA exercise became an opportunity for US medical schools (and universities) 
to  consolidate  their  own  practices  and  policies  and  implement  more  robust  COI  governance 
mechanisms.
A thorough examination of the Canadian policies reveals that while still imperfect, many also show 
important strengths. The Canadian COI policies invariably cover a broader range of issues than those 
used in the AMSA ranking, likely due to the fact that these are university wide policies; that is, while 
these policies apply to medical schools, they are not focused on the concerns specific to medical 
schools (e.g., with regards to pharmaceutical or medical device industry involvement in education). 
For  example,  some  financial  COIs,  such  as  receiving  royalties  for  commercializing  intellectual 
property and holding equity in spin-off companies appear not to be taken into account by the AMSA 
evaluation even though they are obviously a relevant concern for medical schools; the same concerns 
regarding undue influence of industry interests in medical education and research apply to relations 
with spin-off companies. Most Canadian and US university policies place restrictions on such financial 
interests [10]; and many non-financial COI are also accounted for in Canadian (and US) university 
policies (e.g., academic evaluation of faculty member’s immediate family, use of the university’s name 
for personal gain, supervision of graduate students when in relation with faculty members’ spin-off 
companies).
There  are  some issues  that  certain  Canadian  COI  policies  do  not  address  (e.g.,  thresholds  for 
financial interests requiring disclosure, which are required by NIH regulations2); other issues may not 
2 Financial compensation from sponsors to investigators, or investigators’ proprietary interests in a product under study 
(including stock options) have potential for causing bias and raise serious concerns about the integrity of research. Limiting 
financial interests or determining a financial threshold, either in the form of a specific monetary value or percentage of equity,  
may be seen as a safeguard to protect investigators and universities. Nonetheless, in practice it can be very difficult  to 
determine and apply such financial thresholds.
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be treated uniformly (e.g.,  disclosure processes);  and finally,  certain matters are often overlooked 
(e.g., COI issues related to intellectual property). Canadian university COI policies also ranked very 
poorly when it came to dealing explicitly with domains such as “purchasing authority”, “industry sales 
representative” and “industrial scholarships”. We did, however, find some of these issues addressed 
through other institutional policies (e.g., dealing with conflict of commitment or scholarships), although 
it is worth remembering our earlier criticism about having a fragmented approach to managing COI. 
And while some specific issues addressed in the AMSA ranking (e.g., consulting fees, gifts, industrial 
financial  support  to  training activities)  were absent  from Canadian institutional  policies,  Canadian 
institutions also dealt with other issues not evaluated by AMSA, such as limits on patent royalties, 
equity in start-up companies or industry funding of research.  The 16 Canadian university  policies 
evaluated in our study come from the most research-intensive institutions, and so it was no surprise 
that  all  had  relatively  comprehensive  COI  policies  and  procedures,  alongside  other  relevant 
institutional policies or guidelines on “research integrity”, “conflict of commitment” or “ethical conduct 
of research” (e.g., University of Manitoba, McMaster University).
Discussion
Our  findings  correspond  with  those  of  a  recent  Australian  study  [21]  that  applied  the  AMSA 
methodology and found a lower overall mean score in Australian medical schools when compared to 
their US counterparts. But that does not mean that Australian or Canadian university COI policies are 
necessarily  worse  than  those  of  US  institutions  or  even  that  Canadian  and  US  policies  are 
comparable in terms of content. There are important limits – but also benefits – of applying the AMSA 
methodology outside the US context, that must be considered.
 
A major strength of the AMSA PharmFree Scorecard – and other COI policy comparisons [1,2,22-25] 
– is that it brings attention to the importance of having effective institutional policies to address COI 
associated  with  pharmaceutical  and  device  industry  involvement  in  medical  education  and 
professional training. However, while this attention to financial COI is essential and becoming quite 
widespread in higher education policy, there is a  problematic tendency in American and Canadian 
university COI policies to not (or to inadequately) take into account non-financial COI. The reality is 
that not all COI are financial in nature – e.g., interests in academic promotion, personal or professor-
student relationships [26],  or even a particularly strong allegiance to a school of scientific thought 
[27,28]. Policies founded on this limited perspective may not recognize nor address adequately the 
other types of COI, which may also result in real or apparent loss of objectivity or create bias. Our 
concern, then, is that the focus of the AMSA Scorecard on financial COI – while legitimate in the 
context of their focus on university-industry relations – may contribute to the all-too-prevalent notion 
that most if not all problematic interests are financial, and that financial COI are invariably equivalent 
to fraud [29].
Overall, our study also corroborates findings by Lexchin and colleagues in their study of 74 Canadian 
academic health science centres, which demonstrates considerable variability in the scope, focus and 
quality of institutional COI policies [10]. It seems likely that most if not all US medical schools  are 
conscious of these other types of COI (non-financial) and their possible impact on objectivity in health 
sciences research and medical education. AMSA is also sensitive to these issues, stating that: “While 
not addressed here, academic medical centers should also have robust policies to ensure the integrity 
of  basic  and clinical  research,  including policies to ensure that  academic researchers working in 
collaboration with industry retain full control of study design, data, analysis and writing” [18]. Yet, in  
separating out non-financial COI, we feel the AMSA methodology misses an important opportunity to 
bring attention not only to the full diversity of COI, but also to the importance of implementing a variety 
of  appropriate  procedures  to  manage  COI.  More  worrisome,  though,  is  that  this  strategy  may 
encourage  the  ever-present  perception  that  it  is  only  financial  COI  that  matter  or  that  could  be 
potentially problematic.
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Our study of Canadian institutional COI policies highlighted two important mechanisms for managing 
COI that are worth further examination: disclosure and training.
Disclosure
One of the main differences we observed in our study had to do with the manner in which disclosure 
is addressed in COI policies. The AMSA methodology gives a maximum score to public disclosure of 
COI (e.g., on a public website). This is likely based on the commonly held belief in the health sciences 
[12,22,30,31] – and reinforced by the NIH regulations implemented in 2012 for grants and cooperative 
agreements – that it is essential for all stakeholders involved to publicly disclose  all real (actual) or 
potential (perceived) significant financial COI situations (e.g., financial interests over $5,000) [32]. But 
from the AMSA study, we cannot tell how disclosures are managed (monitored) once they are filed 
because it does not score “COI management guidelines” for the cases where COI are unavoidable.
By  contrast,  our  analysis  of  Canadian  policies  found  that  COI  were  often  managed  by  internal 
mechanisms  and  not  always  through  public  disclosure.  Many  policies  relied,  for  example,  on 
Research Ethics Boards in their institution and affiliated hospitals to be informed of any COI related to 
clinical research, and empowered these committees to decide which management measures (e.g., 
requiring disclosure to participants or changes to the recruitments process) were most appropriate to 
manage the particular COI. Similarly, COI are among the issues covered in the 2010 2nd Edition of the 
Tri-Council  Policy  Statement:  Ethical  Conduct  for  Research  Involving  Humans (TCPS2),  and are 
addressed in depth in Chapter 7 [33]. Because COI can jeopardize the integrity of research and the 
protection of research participants (and medical education, given the strong link between research 
and  teaching),  Canadian  institutions  are  invited  to  develop  appropriate  policies,  safeguards  and 
procedures. Our review of Canadian COI policies found that some of the TCPS2 recommendations 
are  still  not  common  (e.g.,  a  central  mechanism  for  COI  management).  And  while  internal 
management  processes may have some limits  (e.g.,  some institutional  COI  may not  be properly 
addressed), so too does internal and public disclosure if they are not dealt with appropriately (e.g., 
misinterpretation and unfounded public mistrust).
It has been shown that the disclosure of unavoidable COI can induce a sense of security on the part  
of the person disclosing – and for those witnessing the disclosure – that gives an unreasonable sense 
that the conflict has been resolved; in other words, disclosure may actually induce an unconscious 
cognitive bias in favour of the person disclosing because disclosure is viewed in a positive manner 
[34].  By  contrast,  the  widespread  negative  perception  of  COI  means  that  many people  may not 
disclose even when it is obligatory for fear of the negative view of colleagues, i.e., that being in a COI 
means that they are unethical [29]. So for disclosure to be accepted as an appropriate response, 
students and researchers who recognise that they may be in an actual or perceived COI must also 
have a significant degree of confidence in institutional mechanisms, i.e., that in disclosing they will be 
dealt  with fairly [35]. While disclosure (either internal or public) can, in many cases, be of utmost 
importance in managing financial and non-financial COI, it is arguably only one part of a robust and 
refined management process. Such a process should, we suggest, involve appropriate and specific 
institutional guidelines and training to assist faculty members, staff and students in the recognition and 
management of any COI in which they may actually, apparently or potentially be involved.
Training
The AMSA Scorecard’s inclusion of COI training in its evaluation highlights the importance of COI 
education  as  a  critical  mechanism  for  building  awareness  and  changing  how  individuals  and 
institutions understand and deal with COI [36]. Even with the different academic contexts between the 
US and Canada, training is still viewed as important. However, all but one Canadian university scored 
0 which shows a significant weakness in Canadian COI policies. There are many examples of training 
tools (e.g.,  online courses, conferences, workshops) developed by US academic institutions (e.g., 
Johns  Hopkins  University  [37],  the  University  of  Texas  Health  Science  Center  at  Houston  [38],  
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Columbia  University  [39])  to  help  students,  faculty  members,  and  staff  recognize  the institutional 
nature of COI situations, and understand how private interests (either financial or non-financial) can 
affect judgment, objectivity and public trust. 
Aside from the University of Sherbrooke, none of the Canadian universities hosting a medical school 
appear  to  have  developed  tools  for  helping  students,  faculty  members  or  administrative  staff  in 
identifying and managing COI. This being the case, it will likely be very difficult for faculty, staff and 
students in these institutions to 1) accurately appreciate when they are in a COI, 2) recognize that  
such situations may cause potential harms (e.g., loss of objectivity, loss of trust), or 3) understand 
whose interests are at risk. Without appropriate education for specific COI situations (both financial 
and non-financial), it will be difficult to create a culture of ethics amongst the members of an institution 
and  ensure  compliance  with  institutional  COI  (and  other  ethics)  policies.  Training  and  education 
should be a key element in a COI policy that aims to build awareness and effective monitoring and 
management of COI [36].
Study Limitations
The application of AMSA Scorecard highlighted the importance of these two aspects, i.e., disclosure 
and training. However, the method used has important shortcomings that are important to note. First, 
as mentioned at the outset, the AMSA Scorecard was created to evaluate and rank (and ultimately 
influence) medical school COI policies as they related to pharmaceutical and medical device industry 
involvement. Our intention in applying the AMSA Scorecard was to see what items differed between 
the  Canadian  university  and  US  medical  school  contexts,  and  to  reflect  on  whether  different 
approaches to dealing with COI were warranted. We are, nevertheless, sensitive to the fact that there 
are a few Canadian medical schools that have (or are in the process of) put in place their own COI 
policies and which may have more stringent provisions that are specific to and focused on those COIs 
typically found in medical schools. 
With regards to our coding method, it was not blinded because we have been working on these policy 
documents  for  quite  some  time  (since  2007)  and  could  identify  them  simply  by  their  content. 
Moreover, we did not have a particular interest in determining which Canadian university “won” or 
performed the best in our study because our objective was not the ranking itself. While the influence 
of excellent or poor AMSA rankings has been a powerful motivator for US medical schools (and thus a 
means of influencing change, at least providing a motivation to develop and provide COI policies), we 
were interested in reflecting on what this ranking system could tell us about the content of Canadian 
COI policies. Finally, while the second coder verified the conclusions of the first coder, we decided 
that  independent  coding  to  calculate  inter-coder  reliability  was  not  necessary.  This  was  decided 
because the coding method was done in a deductive matter (based on the AMSA Scorecard) and 
categories are quite precise, thus there is much less space for interpretation than in an inductive study 
where the coding scheme is established depending on the content analyzed. 
Conclusion
A straightforward application of the  AMSA PharmFree Scorecard to evaluating the quality of COI 
policies  of  medical  education  institutions  outside  the  US  is  likely  of  limited  direct  utility.  The 
considerations that are so important for the US context, namely the disclosure of financial interests in 
unavoidable COI and any involvement of the pharmaceutical and medical device industries in medical 
education, may be less of an issue (though still pertinent) in higher education systems such Canada’s, 
where universities are funded primarily from public sources (e.g., federal and provincial governments). 
Further, in our study of Canadian universities, we found a variety of policies that were pertinent but not 
specifically focused on COI (e.g.,  conflict of commitment,  nepotism, academic integrity, intellectual 
property,  research  ethics).  A  more  in-depth  and  comprehensive  examination  of  institutional 
approaches to  managing  COI  would  have  found  that  most  Canadian  universities  provided  their 
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communities  with  a  diversity  of  mechanisms to  address  COI  [40].  However,  while  these  diverse 
approaches might support attention to a broader range of COI (including non-financial), their very 
diversity and lack of coordination can also undermine appropriate COI disclosure and management. 
As we have shown in our application of the AMSA Scorecard to 16 Canadian university COI policies, it 
is essential to 1) reflect on the utility and limits of disclosure as a COI management mechanism, and 
2) develop and implement  training and educational tools for students, faculty and administrators so 
that they are empowered to both identify COI and manage these situations when they cannot be 
avoided.  The AMSA PharmFree Scorecard has clearly  played an important  role  in motivating US 
medical  education  institutions  to  improve  their  financial  COI  policies,  and  more  generally,  has 
contributed to on-going international reflections on the need to develop and implement effective COI 
policies  in  medical  schools  and  academic  institutions  more  generally.  With  growing  interest  and 
sensitivity on the part of Canadian medical students to issues of COI, we might even see the rise of a 
“Canadian AMSA” movement,  unless Canadian medical  schools,  universities or  other governance 
bodies work proactively to develop “model policies” and procedures for the institutions. 
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